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Introduction 
The Foot and Mouth epidemic in Great Britain brought into sharp focus a 
number of issues of interest to social scientists and rural observers.  
However, despite a growing number of publications on the epidemic 
remarkably few researchers have employed in-depth research techniques. 
This, of course, is easily explained by the access problems presented by 
the disease. Such was the extent of the closure of the countryside, and of 
farms in particular, as part of the attempts to control the spread of the 
disease that for a period few researchers were in a position to engage in 
direct rural research of any kind and certainly not in-depth participant 
observation or ethnography within communities directly affected by the 
disease.  This paper is an attempt to fill that gap, by providing an 
ethnography of the impact of the disease within a single community in a 
locality within the west of Devon, one of the most severely affected 
English counties.   
 
An ethnography was possible because of my own circumstances – a rural 
geographer who happened to be resident in the heart of the outbreak and a 
member of a number of networks encompassing members of the farming 
and political communities.  At this stage it is important to note that 
although my closeness to the immediate impacts of FMD makes this 
account possible it is, as with any ethnography, both partial and particular.  
Even within such a small locale as a west Devon market town and its 
surrounding villages, my own networks did not encompass all caught up in 
the crisis. I did not experience every aspect of the epidemic as it unfolded.    
 
In mid February 2001, just a week after the first confirmed outbreak of the 
epidemic in Essex, a case of FMD was confirmed in the village of 
Highampton in west Devon.  During the following few weeks it spread 
rapidly in Highampton itself and surrounding parishes.  One of the first 
affected, just three miles away, was the small market town of Hatherleigh.  
As a resident of Hatherleigh, I found myself in a unique position to analyse 
the unfolding events both as an observer and a participant.  I participated at 
several levels.  My own tiny flock of sheep (4 ewes) had just lambed.  I 
took part in efforts to give practical support to members of the farming 
community (primarily through regular telephone calls to specific farming 
families organised by local churches.)  In time I became centrally involved 
in regeneration activities in the community (these are not discussed in this 
paper).  In none of these activities was my prime concern social science 
enquiry, but in none of them was this precluded.  I observed and I 
recorded.  I wished to understand events in which I myself was caught up.  
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At the same time I sought to follow the developing national and regional 
debate and literature.  What follows is a short reflection on some of the key 
issues that emerged to me as a social scientist.  Some of the themes set out 
here are being developed into a longer ethnographic account for 
publication elsewhere.  
 
Solidarity and Sharing the Grief  
Both as a local resident and as an owner of sheep I was involved in a 
community caught up in crisis.  Although the proportion of the population 
of Hatherleigh directly involved in agriculture is relatively small (less than 
10%) the economic significance of farming is much greater because of the 
presence of a livestock market.  The influx of farmers and family members 
on market days means that the range of shops and businesses in the 
community is far greater than its own population of could support.  Thus 
an almost immediate consequence of the suspension of the market was a 
sharp decline in the trade of local businesses.  Alongside such local service 
businesses, Hatherleigh contains a number of tourism enterprises – a 
pottery, art gallery, antique shops and pubs. These too saw a rapid fall-off 
in business.   
 
In the first few weeks of the crisis, the real concern of the community 
could be seen in its sympathy for farmers and local businesses.  Initial 
shock and despair seemed to be shared deeply by those in agriculture and 
by the many members of the community not directly involved in farming.  
Local fund-raising efforts were undertaken for the farming charities that 
had been set up.  Hand written notices appeared urging people to support 
local businesses.  This concern for the locality was not entirely new, 
although it was accelerated by FMD.  Research undertaken in a locality 
close to Hatherleigh in 1999 showed an emergent localism in food 
purchasing based on empathy with farmers caught up in the agrarian crisis 
of the late 1990s  (Winter 2002).  A powerful sense of community 
solidarity and mutual support emerged in Hatherleigh.  Conversations in 
the town revolved about the latest news on the spread of the outbreak and 
who had been affected. 
 
To the fore in expressions of practical support were the churches. The 
importance of church ministers as front-line caring ‘professionals’ (see 
Davies et al  1990) was evident from early in the crisis.  While the social 
services, the health service and advice services struggled to organise a 
presence in the town and surrounding villages – it was some weeks before 
these authorities established an emergency crisis advisory centre on the 
Methodist Church premises  - church ministers were already on site.   
 
The Church of England priest organised a network of individuals prepared 
to undertake regular telephone calls to farmers isolated on their farms.  The 
network involved a range of individuals, lay and ordained, Anglican and 
Methodist.  If this was a logical extension to the Church’s historic caring 
and outreach work then there were other aspects of religious response that 
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were more to do with religiosity per se. Sociologists of religion have noted 
the increase in the last twenty years in Britain of ritual acts in response to 
tragedy, notably involving the use of flowers, candles and memorabilia 
either in cases of mass disaster (Davie 1994, Walter 1991) or at the sites of 
road accidents, murders and the like.  In Hatherleigh, this trend was most 
noticeable, not in the Anglican church, but in the Methodist Church 
notwithstanding the anti-ritualist, word-based Bible Christian tradition 
from which Methodism in the locality is derived.  The church not only was 
open daily for prayers but introduced votive candles and a board for the 
display of written prayer requests, poems, and other reflections on the 
crisis. Children of the church produced a display of modelled clay figures 
of animals and people depicting the crisis and providing a further visual 
focus for reflection, prayer, and grieving.    
 
Thus in the early stages, the crisis can be seen as providing examples of 
reinforcing traditional expressions of solidarity but also examples of crisis-
induced change, in the instance given in expressions of religiosity.   
 
The Rituals of Boundary 
The importance of ritual acts was not confined to obvious religiosity. My 
own experience as part of the telephone network brought home to me the 
wide range of responses and reactions to the epidemic within the farming 
community.  In particular, the assumption in the media that all farmers 
were farm-bound and cut off from their usual networks was not true. While 
all took precautions and limited their off-farm movements to some degree, 
farmers exhibited range of behaviours, in part determined by spatial 
location and in part by other factors such as children’s schooling and 
family members with outside occupations. Moreover, behaviour changed 
over time.  Some of those whose families remained farm-bound over the 
first few weeks subsequently modified this extreme strategy with more 
subtle behaviour. This might involve the imposition of strict boundaries 
not so much between the farm and outside world but between different 
activities and functions on the farm. For example, the use of disinfectant, 
and the removal and isolation of on-farm clothing, created a boundary 
between farm and non-farm within the confines of the holding.   
By strictly demarcating the farmhouse (or rooms within it) as ‘clean’, it 
was possible for some members of the farm household to resume a 
relatively normal life.  The rituals of disinfecting, changing clothing, 
showering came to symbolise the negotiation of boundaries necessary for 
off-farm social interaction.  Thus after a few weeks some farmers were 
seen in the streets of Hatherleigh again, including some whose stock had 
been lost to the disease.  But they appeared in unfamiliar garb not in the 
familiar working overalls and wellington boots.     
 
These rituals were clearly seen as bounded temporally.  They were seen as 
a response to crisis to be endured only until ‘we can get back to normal’.  
The new boundaries set were seen as artificial and unsustainable in the 
long term.  Transgressing the boundaries, as a prelude to re-setting them 
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was seen, as both inevitable and desirable.  Thus the symbolic importance 
of the desired return to normality provides a clue to the vitriolic opposition 
felt by many farmers to the continuation of tough biosecurity measures 
long after the crisis was perceived to be over by many farmers.  Most 
farmers can, in actual fact, deal reasonably easily with the biosecurity rules 
that remain in force in auction markets and even with the livestock 
movement restrictions, inconvenient though they may be on occasions.  
However the restrictions provide a lasting reminder both of the disease 
itself and the failure to re-set boundaries. Normality has not returned.       
 
Threats to Solidarity 
As the weeks and months of the epidemic passed, certain threats to the 
initial community solidarity arose, not in the case of Devon between 
tourism operators and farmers as was reported from some parts of the 
country.  From the outset, the media showed a strong interest in 
Highampton and Hatherleigh as centres of the crisis.  For the first two or 
three weeks, and intermittently over the following six months, television 
cameras and crew were present in Hatherleigh, not just from Britain but 
from other countries too.  Both Japanese and US television companies 
were represented early in the crisis.  The town’s mayor and local priest, in 
particular, gave numerous interviews.  I gave some myself.  This coverage 
gave rise to some contention and tension.  Some saw the media coverage 
as exploitative and intrusive.  Some, too, saw it as painting an intrinsically 
negative picture of Hatherleigh.  Participants such as the mayor, were 
urged to take a more positive stance as some claimed that negative news 
coverage was adding to the woes of the community with businesses 
suffering even more than was necessary.  A campaign to publicise that 
Hatherleigh was ‘open for business’ grew up out of these concerns, led by 
the non-agricultural business community in the town.  But care was taken 
to avoid any inference that agriculture might be to blame.  On the contrary, 
the media provided a convenient scapegoat to which to attach blame for 
declining returns in local businesses.  By so doing, the implication that 
there might be competing local interests with regard to farming versus 
non-farming interests was hidden.  Attacks on the media served to cement 
further community solidarity, but underlying tensions had emerged. 
 
These were added to, but again initially submerged by the impact of 
growing disquiet, uncertainty and even opposition to the control methods 
used with regard to the policing of the disease.  The term policing is not 
used in a metaphoric sense for the law required a police presence at the 
entrance to farms during the period after suspicion of the disease up to 
slaughter (in the case of a positive diagnosis).  This could be several days 
so a police presence on a remote rural community arguably any under-
policed hitherto was also a subject of comment in the community. 
 
On March 16th 2001, the government announced a significant amendment 
to its control policy with the introduction of a contiguous cull of livestock 
on farm holdings adjacent to any confirmed outbreak of FMD.  The 
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background to this innovation was epidemiological work undertaken, at 
some speed, by scientists at Imperial College. Nationally the move seemed 
to have the support of the National Farmers Union, but not by many farmer 
representatives locally or regionally. Some in Hatheleigh saw it as an evil 
necessity, others rejected it completely. What is more striking is that non-
farming residents began to voice increasing opposition to the slaughter 
policy and, in particular, the slaughter of healthy animals under the 
contiguous cull. 
 
To a considerable extent, the introduction of a contiguous cull marked a 
turning point in the community’s experience of the disaster.  Hitherto its 
anger and despair had been directed against the impersonal agency of the 
virus itself.  There had been much talk of the nature and characteristics of 
the virus, debate over how it was spread, its durability, its impact.  Now 
the virus was not the sole enemy.  The contiguous cull introduced by 
government edict and the officials charged with enforcing it became, in 
many eyes, an alien antagonistic force.  It became clear that there were 
three main opinions with regard to the cull.  A smaller number, mostly 
farmers, accepted the scientific cure and saw no alternative.  A larger 
number of both farmers and residents were unconvinced by its need and 
efficacy.  They felt there was room for negotiation and compromise.   
Some contiguous culls should be opposed and fought; others, perhaps were 
inevitable.  Critically, such people did not attack the vets and MAFF 
officials charged with inspecting stock and implementing cull policy.  As 
many of the vets, drafted into Ministry teams, were farm vets, some even 
from the locality, this is hardly surprising. Indeed there were a significant 
number of vets who themselves who challenged the need for a cull. 
 
However a third group came to radically challenge the cull and saw it as 
unnecessary and evil.  Conspiracy theories began to take hold in which the 
government was accused of wishing to destroy the UK livestock industry 
with the cull as a convenient tool for this end.  The beleaguered and 
‘victim’ mentality of farmers noted elsewhere (Milbourne et al 2001, Reed 
et al 2002) contributed to this.  Given that the NFU nationally and for the 
main part regionally, accepted the need for the cull, it is not surprising that 
the groundwell of opposition to the cull and to MAFF’s entire handling of 
the crisis, should have led to a new expression of farming opinion, known 
as “The Heart of Devon” established and funded by a local landowner and 
TV personality.  Heart of Devon launched a vigorous press and website 
campaign led by its chief spokesperson, Lisa Johnson, a farmer’s wife 
whose own stock had been lost to FMD.   
 
Ash Moor: A Conflict Unleashed  
The breakdown of consensus over the cull was further fuelled by another 
development that caused even more obvious rifts in the community.  In the 
early weeks of the crisis, carcass disposal was largely undertaken through 
burning on gigantic funeral pyres.  The extent of the burning was in 
contrast to the greater use of burial, including use of lime to accelerate 
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decomposition, in 1968.  In 2001 this method was judged environmentally 
risky, itself a comment on the changing balance of political interests in the 
interim.  But fears grew that pyres were becoming questionable in terms of 
efficiency, impractical because of lack of burning fuel and unacceptable 
because of their symbolic power to deter tourists.  In response, MAFF 
developed ideas for mass burial sites with procedures in place to protect 
ground water.  One such site, and a very large one was chosen three miles 
from Hatherleigh. 
 
Unsurprisingly, public concerns emerged rapidly in relation to public 
health and environmental impact.  A vociferous pressure group opposed to 
the Ash Moor Pit emerged (STAMP).  Protest marches were held, a 24 
hour vigil was held for many weeks at the entrance to the site, public 
meetings, petitions, lobbying, all took place.  Notwithstanding the 
reassurances provided by both ?MAFF? and the Environment Agency that 
the risks were minimal and the site was only a contingency measure that 
hopefully would not be needed, rumours in the community were rife.  
These reached a pitch during the General Election campaign of May/June 
2001.  STAMP campaigners opined that a mass cull would be put in place 
covering all sheep on Dartmoor and Exmoor immediately after the 
election.  By this stage, blood-testing was taking place throughout the 
country and the reports from MAFF and vets on the ground were that very 
few positive results were being found.  These views were flatly 
contradicted by STAMP campaigners.  Not surprisingly, notwithstanding a 
general criticism of MAFF, not everyone in the community shared this 
analysis.  Some were reassured by MAFF and, more significantly, some 
felt that the control of disease and farmers’ interests in rapid carcass 
disposal were of paramount concern.  Collision was inevitable.  The main 
protagonists defending the Ash Moor idea was the local Anglican priest, 
supported by some other church people. From being a local figure, with a 
high degree of media coverage as a community spokesman at the outset of 
the campaign, the priest was now vilified for his failure to support 
STAMP. He was seen as failing to show care and concern over the 
possible negative environmental and health consequences of the site, As a 
STAMP poster cruelly out it, “what can be sicker than an uncaring vicar?”  
 
How should the Ash Moor incident be interpreted?  At one level STAMP 
is a classic example of a spontaneous local environmental pressure group, 
although the lack of involvement of mainstream environmental pressure 
groups is notable.  The strength of feeling and the high level of distrust of 
MAFF/DEFRA and the Environment Agency meant that any constructive 
and participative engagement was almost impossible to promote. Whatever 
the rights and wrongs of the scientific argument surrounding the site, it 
seems clear Ash Moor Pit provided the catalyst for an outburst of anger 
directed at the authorities perceived to be, in some measure, responsible 
for the FMD disaster.  Ash Moor became a symbol for those critical of the 
manner in which the FMD epidemic had been handled.  It is a small step 
from criticising a particular mode of carcass disposal to attacking the 
extent and nature of the cull.  Here STAMP was able both to contribute to, 
and draw on, a wider critique of, in particular, the contiguous cull. 
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Because of these links, it would be simplistic to see the Ash Moor dispute 
as instigating or reinforcing a rift between farming and non-farming 
interests.   On the contrary, the Ash Moor dispute took place at a time 
when the agricultural consensus on how to approach the disease was itself 
breaking down.  A critique of the contiguous cull from farmers found 
particular expression in other emergent local politics surrounding the 
‘Heart of Devon’ campaign as well as in the growing dissent from the 
organic farming community.  
 
There can be little doubt that the strength of opinion represented in 
STAMP and Heart of Devon, contributed towards a growing regional 
dimension to the politics of FMD.  These processes were replicated in the 
NFU regionally, where there was a growing distance between the local and 
regional NFU position and the Union’s central policy on contiguous cull 
and vaccination. 
 
Conclusions  
These reflections have not been entirely easy to write. My closeness to the 
events both spatially and emotionally remains. I am neither distanced nor 
separated from what happened. The boundaries I have erected between 
myself and the events I have described are those of academic language and 
convention. But those are frail and insubstantial. I remain too close to 
events to be entirely comfortable or capable of finding any firm 
conclusions to this particular paper. Perhaps that will come with temporal 
distance.  In the meantime these reflections may offer some insights into 
an event that is already all too often only described in the arid languages of 
statistical analysis, economic impacts and policy implications.          
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